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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE




The energy crisis foreseen by experts for decades became a
reality for America in the 1970's, when sudden cutbacks in the
supply of imported oil produced higher prices and occasional panic
buying. Americans were surprised to learn that their energy sup-
plies are finite and that they depend on the good will of other
nations for resources vital to the industrial way of life. Coal and
nuclear engergy are being explored as alternatives to oil, but the
nation remains dependent on foreign sources for other important
minerals. It must compete with other industrialized nations for
the mineral riches of the third world and the vast supply of
resources which may lie below the oceans.
For these reasons, increased emphasis is being placed on the
need to further explore and develop our domestic mineral
resources. This will result in opening new mines and further ex-
ploiting existing mines. Unfortunately, it also will result in an in-
creased risk of fatalities and serious injuries to those who work
in this dangerous occupation. Half a million persons are employed
in mining and each miner's chances of being killed on the job have
been estimated to be eight times greater than those of a laborer
in manufacturing.1
The first federal legislation dealing with safety in the nation's
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H.R. REP. No. 312,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H. REP],
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3401, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977 at 357 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.].
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coal mines was enacted in 1910.2 The safety of metal and non-
metal miners was.first addressed by Congress in 1966.1 In 1969,
Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
(Coal Act),4 the first mine safety law with strong enforcement pro-
visions and the first to protect the rights of miners who complain
of safety violations. Like its predecessors, the Coal Act was
prompted by a mine disaster.' It did not end the disasters,
however. In 1972, ninety-one miners perished in a fire in a silver
mine in Idaho;6 in 1976, twenty-six lost their lives in methane ex-
plosions in a coal mine in Kentucky.' Following extensive hear-
ings in 1975 and 1976, Congress decided to unify mine safety and
health legislation under one statute, the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act).' Now the same law covers the ex-
traction and processing of virtually all solid minerals.
Congress was not under the illusion that passing a law
eliminated safety and health problems in the mining industry. Min-
ing remains a dangerous occupation.' Federal Inspectors employed
2 Act of May 16, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-179, 36 Stat. 369 (1910) (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. 5§ 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3 FEDERAL METAL & NONMETTALIC MINE SAFETY ACT, Pub. L. No. 89-577, 80
Stat. 772 (1966) repealed by Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendment Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164,91 Stat. 1290, 1322 (codified at 30 U.S.C. SS 801-962 (Supp.
IV 1980)) [hereinafter cited as the Metal Act].
I FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
83 Stat. 742 (1969) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. SS 801-962 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980)) [hereinafter cited as Coal Act].
I A methane gas explosion killed 78 men in a coal mine in Farmington, West
Virginia, in November of 1968. H. REP., supra note 1, at 4. LEG. HIST., supra note
1 at 360. See also D. MCATEER, MINERS MANUAL, 346-47 (1981).
1 S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.],
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3404.
7Id.
- 30 U.S.C. % 801-962 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as the Mine Act].
The Act transferred enforcement powers from the Interior Department's Mining
Enforcement and Safety Administration to the Department of Labor. It also
transferred adjudicatory responsibilities from the Interior Board of Mine Opera-
tions Appeals to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. Two
excellent articles summarizing the significant features of the Act are Galloway,
McAteer and Webb, A Miner's Bill of Rights, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 397 (1978);
Newcom, Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977-An Overview, 1979 CoLo.
LAW. 1587.
' Roof falls, for example, are an ever-present hazard in underground min-
ing. During 1980, 55 miners were seriously injured or killed by roof falls. 5 MINE
REGULATION & PRODUCTIVITY REPT. No. 11, at 7 (1981). A recent survey revealed
the incidence of injuries in mining to be the second highest in all industries. 2
2
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by the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (MSHA)1 are required to inspect every underground mine
at least four times and every surface mine at least twice each
year." If violations of MSHA's mandatory safety and health regula-
tions are found, 2 the inspector must issue citations and may even
summarily order certain section to the mine to be closed or certain
equipment to be removed.1 3 A civil penalty of up to $10,000 may
be imposed for each violation. Citations, orders, and the proposed
penalties based upon them, may be contested before an indepen-
dent agency, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Com-
mission (Commission). 5
The Mine Act imposed on MSHA and the Commission another
important responsibility in protecting miners' safety and health.
Congress was convinced that, for the Mine Act to be effective,
the miners themselves must play a role in the enforcement pro-
cess." The Mine Act thus grants a number of rights to miners,
chief among them the right to obtain an inspection on request,
1 7
and provides that retaliation against a miner for exercising those
rights is itself a violation of the Mine Act. Miners who believe
they have been retaliated against many complain to MSHA and
may obtain a hearing and appropriate relief, if warranted, from
the Commission. This protection against discrimination, embodied
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED
STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1978 (1980). See also MSHA U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INFO. REP.
No. 1133-37 INJURY EXPERIENCE IN MINING, 1980 (1981).
,0 Hereinafter cited as MSHA or the Secretary.
I 30 U.S.C. 5 813(a) (Supp. IV 1980). No such requirement is contained in
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651-675 (Supp. IV. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as OSHA]. A federal inspecter might not visit an establishment
covered by the OSHA for years.
The Secretary of Labor is directed in Section 101 of the Mine Act, supra
note 8, at S 811 to develop, promulgate, and revise mandatory health and safety
standards for coal or other mines. These standards are collected in 30 C.F.R.
5§ 11.1-100.7 (1981).
3 30 U.S.C. § 814, 817 (Supp. IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp. IV. 1980).
,I Hereinafter called the Commission. 30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (Supp. IV 1980). The
Commission is established in § 113 of the Mine Act, supra note 8, at § 823. Cita-
tions and orders are generally contestable even before MSHA has proposed a
civil penalty. Energy Fuels Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 1 FMSHRC 299, 1 MSHC
(BNA) 2013 (1979).
,1 S. REP., supra note 6, at 35, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 3435.
1 30 U.S.C. 5 813(g) (Supp. IV 1980). Procedures for processing such com-
plaints are described in 30 C.F.R. % 43.1-.8 (1981).
1982] 1025
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in section 105(c) of the Mine Act,"9 is the subject of this article.
Section 110(b) of the 1969 Coal Act
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 was
prompted by the same sort of event which triggered earlier enact-
ments, a mine disaster. On November 20, 1968, seventy-eight
miners perished when methane gas leaking from a coal seam touch-
ed off an explosion in an underground coal mine in Farmingtoh,
West Virginia. Public attention was again focused on the industry's
abysmal safety record, and also on the serious and widespread
health problem only recently acknowledged to be associated with
coal mining-coal miner's pneumoconiosis, or black lung.
The Coal Act extended the Interior Department's (Interior)
jurisdiction to virtually all coal mines. It, gave Interior a number
of new enforcement tools as well. Federal Inspectors were per-
mitted to enter mine property without a warrant. 9 They were
empowered to issue "orders of withdrawal" immediately closing
down a mine until certain conditions were corrected.' Inspectors
were also authorized to halt production in any area of a mine which
contained an excessive level of respirable dust." And, for the first
time, the Coal Act enabled, Interior to promulgate mandatory
health and safety regulations for coal mines.
The Coal Act was based on the belief that, the miners
themselves were a key link in the enforcement process." Thus,
miners' representatives were given the right to obtain immediate
inspection of hazardous conditions and the right to accompany the
Federal Inspector during the "walkaround" portion of the inspec-
tion. 4 The Coal Act also entitled them to participate as parties
in administrative proceedings. 5
" 30 U.S.C. S 815(c) (Supp. IV. 1980).
19 Coal Act, supra note 4, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 103(b), 83 Stat. 742, 749 (1969)
(amended 1977).
' Coal Act, supra note 4, Pub. L. No. 91-173, S 104(b), 83 Stat. 742, 751 (1969)
(amended 1977).
"I Coal Act, supra note 4, Pub. L. No. 91-173, S 104(1), 83 Stat. 742, 753-54
(1969) (amended 1977).
' Coal Act, supra note 4, Pub. L. No. 91-173, S 101, 83 Stat. 742, 745 (1969)
(amended 1977).
See 115 Cong. Rec. 27948 (1969).
" Coal Act, supra note 4, Pub. L. No. 91-173, SS 103(g), 103(h), 83 Stat 742,
750 (1969).
1 Coal Act, supra note 4, Pub. L. No. 91-173 S 105, 83 Stat. 742, 753 (1969)
(amended 1977). 1 1
1026 [Vol. 84
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Section 110(b) was not part of the bill reported out of the
Senate Labor Committee. Senator Kennedy introduced it as a floor
amendment during the legislative debates.' As enacted, the rele-
vant portion provides:
No person shall discharge or in any other way discriminate
against or cause to be discharged or discriminated against any
miner or any authorized representative of miners by reason of
the fact that such miner or representative (A) has notified the
Secretary or his authorized representative of any alleged viola-
tion or danger, (B) has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed
or instituted any proceeding under this Act, or (C) has testified
or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the admin-
istration or enforcement of the provisions of this Act.'
In his remarks, the Senator compared this provision with pro-
visions in the National Labor Relations Act 8 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act' designed to protect employees who notify federal
officials of possible. violations from reprisals by their employers.
It was not clear, however, whether section 110(b) was enacted sole-
ly to safeguard the channels of communication between employees
and the government or additionally was intended to create rights
in miners independent of the enforcement process.
The Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals' took the view
that section 110(b) was designed solely to guard the government's
enforcement process. Thus, it held that miners were protected
from retaliation only when they complained directly to Interior's
Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA). Com-
plaints to foremen or supervisors were unprotected as was self-
help based on those complaints. Two miners, however, challeng-
ed this view and the result of their challenge was a new, expan-
sive interpretation of section 110(b).
The Evolution of Section 110(b)
On April 15, 1971, Glen Munsey and two co-workers were
115 Cong. Rec. 27947 (1969).
2 Coal Act, supra note 4, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 110(b), 83 Stat. 742, 758-59
(1969) (amended 1977).
29 U.S.C. 141-187 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as Labor Act].
- 29 U.S.C. 201-219 (Supp. IV 1980).
1 Hereinafter called the Interior Board. The Board, which acted for the
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assigned to a crew installing roof supports in an underground
mine. While they were working, a five-ton rock fell on a nearby
machine. The roof was then inspected by a foreman who pro-
nounced it safe. A short time later, one of the miners noticed
debris trickling from the roof, a sign that another fall might be
imminent. Munsey and his co-workers refused to continue work-
ing in the area, and they were subsequently discharged because
of this refusal.
The administrative law judge (AL) 31 decided that the miners
had been discharged unlawfully. He placed special importance on
the fact that these miners were known by management to have
registered safety complaints with federal officials in the past. The
intent to penalize them for this activity was, he said, in itself a
violation of section 110(b).
[It is immaterial whether a discharged miner has in fact com-
plained to the government, for the focus of section 110(b)(1}(A)
is upon the intent of the employer. Thus, if the purpose is to
discriminate against a miner in the belief-mistaken or other-
wise-that the miner has notified the Bureau [of Mines] of an
alleged violation or danger or has probably done so, a violation
is established regardless whether the miner in fact complained
to the Bureau.32
In addition to holding that a miner's safety complaint to a
supervisor was protected under section 110(b), the administrative
law judge also held that the subsequent refusal to work was
protected. This right, he said, was necessarily derived from section
103(g) of the Coal Act, which gave miners the right to secure an
inspection. The ALJ reasoned that the purpose of section 103(g)
would be thwarted if miners presenting a good faith safety com-
plaint could be required to work under a condition which they
feel is an imminent danger, pending the time required for their
representative to get the Federal Inspector to come to the scene.
Some accomodation is indicated, whether it be temporary reassign-
ment of duties or an arrangement between the miner's represen-
tative and the operator. Discharge is obviously not an answer.3
11 Administrative law judges were called Hearing Examiners when the deci-
sion was issued.
3 Munsey v. Smitty Baker Coal Co., IBMA Docket No. NORT 71-96, p. 51
(Decision of the Hearing Examiner, Feb. 29, 1972).
1 Id. at 41-42.
[Vol. 841028
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Four months later, the same ALJ decided another major case
under section 110(b). It involved a miner named Franklin Phillips
who was operating a shuttle car at Kentucky Carbon's Mine No.
1 in Phelps, Kentucky. His job was to receive coal from a
mechanized loader and transport it to a belt conveyor. Each time
coal was loaded, it stirred up a cloud of coal dust which made
it difficult for Phillips to breathe and caused him to cough. The
loader had water sprays which were supposed to control the dust,
but the sprays were often clogged and required frequent clean-
ing. Phillips reported the problems to his foreman as he had many
times before. When the dust became too thick for him, Phillips
and the loader operator stopped work to clean the sprays. The
foreman expressed exasperation at the delay, and Phillips told
him that he had had enough of the coal dust and would not work
in it. The foreman told him he was fired.
The ALJ found a violation of section 110(b).34 As in Munsey,
he found that Phillips was known to have made frequent safety
and health complaints. He stressed again the connection between
section 103(g) and section 110(b). The most significant point about
the decision, however, is the fact that the condition confronting
Phillips did not threaten death or immediate bodily harm, as did
the condition confronting Munsey.5 Nevertheless, the ALJ upheld
his right to refuse to work and ordered the company to provide
Phillips with back pay.
The Interior Board reversed the ALJ in both cases." Reading
the statute literally, it concluded that complaints to supervisory
personnel could not be equated with complaints to the Secretary
of the Interior or his authorized representative, and were not pro-
tected under the Coal Act.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Phillips v. Kentucky Carbon Coal Co., IBMA Docket No. NORT 71-115 (Deci-
sion of the Hearing Examiner, June 8, 1972).
- Coal dust can present a fire hazard when an ignition source is present,
but Phillips' basic complaint was difficulty in breathing. However, the court of
appeals which affirmed the ALJ stated that "excessive dust plus defective wir-
ing is an explosive safety hazard; we cannot assume that Phillips' complaint went
only to a long term health hazard." Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operation
Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 780 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
See infra note 84.
1 Munsey v. Smitty Baker Coal Co., 1 IBMA 144 (1972); Phillips v. Kentucky
Carbon Coal Co., 2 IBMA 5 (1973).
1982] 1029
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reversed the Board in both cases."7 The court's decision in each
case was grounded upon two considerations. First, the court em-
phasized the AL's finding that each mine had established pro-
cedures for reporting safety and health violations in its collective
bargaining agreement, and that these procedures, providing for
temporary reassignment to alternative work, had not been fol-
lowed. The court felt that the collective bargaining agreements
complemented section 110(b) and had the effect of extending it
into the workplace: notifying one's foreman was logically the first
step in a process leading ultimately to notifying MESA. 8
The more far-reaching aspect of the court's decision was its
"penumbral analysis." Phillips, said the court, "brought himself
within the penumbra of the Safety Act by notifying his foreman
of defective equipment creating dangerous working conditions."'39
The court went beyond the ALJ's reliance on section 103(g) to
the "overall remedial purpose of the statute."4 A broad construc-
tion of section 110(b) was required because Congress, in Senator
Kennedy's words, "wanted] to encourage the reporting of
suspected violations of health and safety regulations.""
The court's extension of section 110(b) to cover reports to
supervisory personnel was ratified by Congress when it replaced
the Coal Act with the 1977 Mine Act. Section 105(c) now protects
miners when they make a "complaint notifying the operator or
the operator's agent, or the representative of miners ... of an
alleged danger or safety or health violation .... .'42 Congress
did not, however, codify the ultimate holding in Munsey and
Phillips that miners have the right to refuse to work under con-
ditions they think are hazardous or unhealthful. The Commission,
however, has endorsed this holding and has further refined it. 3
7 Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Phillips v. Interior Bd.
of Mine Operation Appeals, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 420 U.S.
938 (1975).
507 F.2d at 1208 n.32; 500 F.2d at 779-80.
500 F.2d at 774. This analysis may have been based on the Supreme Court
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which Justice Douglas
fashioned a constitutional right to privacy from the "penumbra" of the Bill of
Rights.
40 500 F.2d at 779.
,1 Id. at 782 (quoting Senator Kennedy, 115 CONG. REc. 27,948 (1969)).
, 30 U.S.C. S 815(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
, See infra notes 63-101 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 841030
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SECTION 105(c) OF THE 1977 MINE ACT
Section 105(c)(1)
While the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare was
considering proposals to strengthen the Coal Act and the Metal
Act, two methane explosions took the lives of twenty-three miners
and three Federal Inspectors at the Scotia Coal Mine in Eastern
Kentucky in March, 1976. In the words of the Committee, these
and other tragedies "signal[led] a pressing need for legislative im-
provements in our mine safety and health programs."" The Con-
gressional response was the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977. It covers not only the coal mines but virtually all activities
involved in the extraction of solid minerals from the earth. The
Act streamlined the penalty process, gave the governmemt addi-
tional enforcement tools, and significantly liberlized the anti-
discrimination provisions.4"
Under section 110(b) of the Coal Act, a complaining miner had
to prosecute his own case. Under the Mine Act, a miner who
alleges discrimination must file his complaint with the Secretary
of Labor within sixty days of the adverse action. If upon investiga-
tion, the Secretary determines that a violation occurred, he will
file a complaint on the miner's behalf with the Commission. If the
Secretary decides not to file a complaint with the Commission,
the miner may proceed on his own by filing a complaint with the
Commission within thirty days after the date he is notified of the
Secretary's decision. Should the Commission find a violation, it
may grant appropriate relief, including reinstatement, back pay,
and attorneys' fees. In addition, a civil penalty may be imposed
on the violator.
What is Protected Activity?
Section 105(c) protects miners, representatives of miners, and
" S. REP., supra note 6, at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 3404.
11 Section 105(c)(1) of the 1977 Mine Act reads:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against or cause
to be discharged or cause discrimination against or otherwise interfere with the
exercise of the statutory rights of any miner, representative of miners or appli-
cant for employment in any coal or other mine subject to this Act because such
miner, representative of miners or applicant for employment has filed or made
a complaint under or related to this Act, including a complaint notifying the
1982] 1031
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applicants for employment46 from adverse action because of pro-
tected activity. The action is adverse if the offending person "dis-
charge[s] or in any manner discriminate[s] against or cause[s] to
be discharged or cause discrimination against . . ... " Proof of
the adverse action is commonly the easiest burden for a complain-
ant to satisfy, since it is the adverse action which prompts the
filing of the complaint."8
Section 105(c)(1) embraces three types of protected activity.49
operator or the operator's agent, or the representative of the miners at the coal
or other mine of an alleged danger or safety or health violation in a coal or other
mine, or because such miner, representative of miners or applicant for employ-
ment is the subject of medical evaluations and potential transfer under a stan-
dard published pursuant to section 101, or because such miner, representative
of miners or applicant for employment has instituted or caused to be instituted
any proceeding under or related to this Act or has testified or is about to testify
in any such proceeding, or because of the exercise by such miner, representative
of miners or applicant for employment on behalf of himself or others of any
statutory right afforded by this Act. 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
" A "miner" is "any individual working in a coal or other mine." 30 U.S.C.
S 802(g) (Supp. IV. 1980). The term includes a foreman or a supervisor. Eagle v.
Southern Ohio Coal Co., 2 FMSHRC 3728, 3729 2 MSHC (BNA) 1182 (1980). One
may claim the protections of S 11(c) of OSHA even if he is a former employee
or an employee of someone other than the discriminator. 29 C.F.R. S 1977.5 (1981).
Cf. Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977); Sibley Memorial
Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). "Representatives of Miners" are
required by MSHA to register their status. 30 C.F.R. % 40.1-.4 (1981). However,
the failure to file under these regulations may have little or no effect on their
statutory rights. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 3 FMSHRC 617,
2 MSHC (BNA) 11185 (1981). Hereinafter, "miner" refers to the class of persons
protected by S 105(c).
" The sentence continues, "or otherwise interfere with the exercise of the
statutory rights of any miner .. " This is redundant since the fourth basis for
discrimination under S 105(c)(1) is "because of the exercise ... of any statutory
rights afforded by this Act." 30 U.S.C. S 815(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
"However, in Local 9800, UMWA v. Dupree, 3 FMSHRC 958,2 MSHC (BNA)
1077 (1981), it was held that a Federal Mine Inspector's phone call to the Union's
District President to express displeasure over a letter the union had written to
MSHA headquarters criticizing MSHA inspectors did not constitute adverse action
under the statute.
" There is also one protected status "because such miner ... is the subject
of medical evaluation and potential transfer under a standard published pursuant
to section 101 .. " 30 U.S.C. 5 815(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 101(a)(7) provides
that miners-who may suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity
by reason of a covered hazard must be reassigned to other work at the same
rate of pay. 30 U.S.C. S 811(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1980). This protection is intended
particularly for potential victims of black lung disease, and dovetails with 5 428
of the Mine Act, supra note 8, at S 938, administered by the Department of Labor,
which protects miners who have black lung from discharge or discrimination. This
[Vol. 841032
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To succeed, a complainant must show a connection between an
adverse action and one of these protected activities. The first is
filing or making a complaint under or related to the Mine Act.0
This is the broadest portion of section 105(c). It codified the
Phillips holding by providng that "a complaint notifying the
operator or the operator's agent, or the representative of the
miners" is protected when he complains of an "alleged" danger;
the condition need not be actually dangerous or actually a violation
of a safety or health regulation. It is likely that the miner's belief
in a dangerous condition must be bona fide, however.5 ' Whether
it must be reasonable as well is a question left unsettled at this
writing. If the miner not only complains, but acts on his belief
by refusing to work, the belief must be a reasonable one under
the circumstances. The right to refuse to work will be discussed
more fully below.
Discrimination for instituting a proceeding under the Mine
Act or testifying in such a proceeding is the second type of pro-
scribed activity.2 The purpose of this provision, like the similar
provision in section 110(b) of the Coal Act, is to safeguard the
integrity of MSHA's investigative processes. (The Interior Board
in Phillips and Munsey felt this way the only purpose of section
110(b)). The protection is designed, like a similar provision in the
National Labor Relations Act, "to prevent ... [MSHA's] channels
of information from being dried up by employer intimidation of
prospective complainants and witnesses."' Whether a miner claim-
ing discrimination under this portion of section 105(c) must have
acted in good faith is unsettled.'
basis for discrimination has produced no major cases under § 105(c) and will not
be developed in this article. k
E.g., Secretary of Labor ex rel. West v. Elkins Energy Corp., 1 FMSHRC
558, 1 MSHC (BNA) 2136 (1979). Mere complaints about job duties and general
disagreements with supervisors are unprotected. Secretary of Labor ex rel. Miller
v. Old Ben Coal Co., 2 FMSHRC 294, 1 MSHC (BNA) 2333 (1980).
"1 Secretary of Labor ex rel. Robinette v. United Castle Coal Co., 3 FMSHRC
803, 812, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1213 (1981). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1977.9(c) (1981).
- E.g., Secretary of Labor ex rel. Noland v. Luck Quarries, Inc., 2 FMSHRC
954, 1 MSHC (BNA) 2426 (1980).
500 F.2d at 782, quoting from NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
"' The D.C. Circuit has ruled that even bad faith complaints to the Secretary
of Interior were protected under § 110(b) of the Coal Act. Munsey v. FMSHRC,
595 F.2d 735, 742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In support, the court cited NLRB precedent.
However, it is questionable whether the Labor Act protects bad faith charges
of unfair labor practices. Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 662, 664 (2d
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The third type of protected activity is similar to the first. It
prohibits. discrimination "because of the exercise . . . of any
statutory right afforded by this Act."5 The most important sta-
tutory rights are the rights to request an inspection," the right
to accompany an inspector as he inspects the mine and the right
to be paid at one's usual rate while doing soY Miners also have
the right to be compensated when they are withdrawn from a
mine pursuant to a government order58 and to retain their rates
of pay when, for health reasons, they are transferred to other
areas of the mine.59 They are entitled to participate in proceedings
before the Secretary of Labor and the Commission.' The operator
of a mine must keep them informed on their exposure to harmful
materials 1 and must provide adequate training for their jobs.2
It should be borne in mind that a miner is protected when he
exercises these rights "on behalf of others" as well as on his own
behalf.
The Right To Refuse to Work
By far the most controversial right afforded miners is the right
to refuse to work. The right is nowhere mentioned in section 105(c),
but the legislative history strongly supports the ultimate holding
in Munsey and Phillips: "This section is intended to give miners,
Cir. 1966). See also Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th
Cir. 1969). (Title VII, Civil Rights Act).
' E.g., Magma Copper Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 1 FMSHRC 1948, 1 MSHC
(BNA) 2227 (1979), aff'd, 645 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 475
(1981). The use of the word "statutory" is noteworthy, since it conceivably could
be interpreted to exclude judicially created rights, such as the right to refuse
to work under hazardous conditions. Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. S 660(c) (1976), which corresponds to S 105(c), does not so
modify the work "rights."
30 U.S.C. S 813(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
Id. at 5 813(f).
Id. at S 821. Complaints for compensation are sui generis however. A
separate set of administrative requirements applies to them. 29 C.F.R. % 2700.35
(1981).
"' 30 U.S.C. § 811 (Supp. IV 1980). See also 30 C.F.R. % 90.1, et seq. (1981).
According to a recent decision, a miner retains only the pay rate he had prior
to transfer; he does not receive pay increases granted to those in his pre-transfer
job after his transfer. Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.
1981).
'0 30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (Supp. IV 1980). See also 29 C.F.R. S 2700.4; 30 C.F.R.
SS 43.1-44.3 (1981).
30 U.S.C. S 811 (Supp. IV 1980).
Id. at § 825. See also 30 C.F.R. % 48.1-.32 (1981).
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their representatives and applicants, the right to refuse to work
in conditions they believe to be unsafe or unhealthful and to refuse
to comply if their employers order them to violate a safety and
health standard promulgated under the law."'
The Commission has adopted and further sharpened the con-
tours of the judicially developed right to refuse to work." In
Secretary of Labor ex rel. Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Co.,65 the
Commission found that a miner had been wrongfully discharged
when he refused to operate a continuous mining machine. He com-
plained that it was excessively noisy and gave him a headache,
an earache, and made him nervous.6 The grievance procedure in
the mine's collective bargaining agreement was followed, and
Pasula's union representative agreed with the company that the
machine was not too loud to operate. A Federal Mine Inspector
also tested the machine but found no noise violation." Neverthe-
less, the Commission held that the company's decision to fire him
for refusing to work violated section 105(c).
The Commission had no difficulty in deciding that "miners
have some right to refuse to work under the 1977 Mine Act."69
The difficult issue is to determine which refusals to work fall
within the ambit of "protected activity." In Pasula, the Commis-
sion concluded that the evidence established that the miner's "good
faith belief was reasonable, and was directed to a hazard that we
consider sufficiently severe . . . ."0 Thus, the factors to be con-
sidered in analyzing a refusal to work are the miner's state of
I S. REP., supra note 6, at 36, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS
at 3436. One may wonder how representatives of miners and applicants for employ-
ment can avail themselves of this right. Perhaps the section authorizes the former
to call a strike and the latter to some form of relief if they refuse a job offer
for fear of its dangerous nature.
A right to refuse to work was developed by rulemaking under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1977.1 (1981).
- 2 FMSHRC 2786, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1001 (1980), rev'd sub nom. Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Marshall, 663 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 2787, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1002.
Id. at 2788, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1002. The agreement provided that no
employee would be required to work under conditions he had reasonable grounds
to believe could cause death or serious physical harm. If the existence of such
a condition was disputed, the employee had the right to request an evaluation
by a union committeeman. If the committeeman disagreed with the employee,
the employee was obligated to return to work.
cs Id.
Id. at 2790, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1004.
Id. at 2793. 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1006.
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mind and in the severity of the condition which troubles him."
The court of appeals, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the Commission
because it found, contrary to the Commission's finding, that Pasula
was discharged not for refusing to work, but.because he prevented
anyone else from operating his machine.'2 The court did not
repudiate the test laid down by the Commission in Pasula.
The Commission supplied some of the standards to be followed
in determining whether a refusal to work is protected in Secretary
of Labor ex rel. Robinette v. United Castle Coal Co.73 It held that
the good faith required of a miner who refuses to work "simply
means an honest belief that a hazard exists."7' The miner's honest
perception must also be "a reasonable one under the circum-
stances."'75 The National Labor Relations Act (Labor Act) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) provide similar pro-
tections for employees who refuse to work under dangerous con-
ditions. But section 502 of the Labor Act requires that "ascer-
tainable, objective evidence" support a refusal to work," while
OSHA requires that a "reasonable person" would have shared the
employee's belief.77 The Commission emphasized that "reasonable
minds can differ" and so long as a miner can justify his belief
with "detail, inherent logic and overall credibility" he will satisfy
the standard.78
The Commission twice declined in these cases to explain how
1 For a miner to claim the protection of S 105(c), he must, at the time he
refuses to work, expressly ground his refusal on an unsafe condition. Secretary
of Labor ex rel. Duncan v. T.K. Jesup, Inc., 3 FMSHRC 1880, 2 MSHC (BNA)
456 (1981); Boone v. Rebel Coal Co., 3 FMSHRC 1707, 2 MSHC (BNA) 408 (1981);
Adkins v. Deskins Branch Coal Co., 2 FMSHRC 2803, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1023 (1980).
r Consolidation Coal Co. v. Marshall, 663 F.2d 1211, 1221 (3d Cir. 1981).
3 FMSHRC 803, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1213 (1981).
7' Id. at 810, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1219.
Id. at 812, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1220.
71 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974) (quoting Gateway
Coal Co. v. UMWA, 466 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3d Cir. 1972) (Rosenn, J., dissenting)).
Section 502 prevents a refusal to work under such conditions from being deemed
a strike. Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Labor Act provide a more lenient standard,
requiring only that a refusal to work be undertaken in concert with other workers
and in good faith. NLRB v. Modern Carpet Indus., Inc., 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir.
1979). Two commonly cited examples of the right involving abnormally cold and
abnormally hot working conditions, respectively, are NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9 (1962) and NLRB v. Knight-Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
29 C.F.R. S 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
"' 3 FMSHRC at 812, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1220. Since the Commission did not
embrace an objective standard of reasonableness, it is unclear how subjective
1036 [Vol. 84
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severe the safety or health hazard must be to justify a refusal
to work. 9 Pasula's discomfort was considered "sufficiently severe,
whether or not the right to refuse to work is limited to hazards
of some severity."' In Robinette, the company argued that the
hazard facing the miner did not threaten death or serious bodily
harm. "This case," said the Commission, "does not require definitive
answer as to whether any criteria like these should be adopted."'"i
The dissenting opinion in the court of appeals decision in Pasula
criticized the Commission for its failure to "articulate some stan-
dard as to the severity of the hazard which triggers the right. 82
Proof of an "abnormally dangerous condition for work" is re-
quired under section 502 of the Labor Act.3 An employee claim-
ing the right to refuse to work under OSHA must believe "that
there is a real danger of death or serious injury and that there
is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate
the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement
channels. ' Indeed, this "urgency factor" was and remains the
the miner's perception can be and still remain reasonable. Certain industries in
which employees assemble or work with high technology equipment have been
afflicted with complaints of "funny smells", headaches, and nausea in recent years.
Experts attribute these reactions to fear of unfamiliar and complex devices. 11
OSHR (BNA) 6 (1981). Nevertheless, the fear, and the reactions, are very real
to the employees involved. Would the Mine Act sanction a refusal to work under
these circumstances?
" The legislative history indicates that no hazard need accompany the refusal
to work. According to the drafters, "the refusal to comply with orders which
are violative of the Act or any standard" is protected activity. S. REP., supra
note 6, at 35, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEws at 3435. What
if a miner refuses to work in an area he considers unclean or disorderly? 30 C.F.R.
§5 57.20-3 (1981). Would this be reasonable? Is it protected activity? A recent
case held that refusal to work where the employer failed to provide clean and
readily accessible toilet facilities is protected. Edwards v. Aaron Mining, Inc.,
3 FMSHRC 2630 (1981).
2 FMSHRC at 2793, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1006.
3 FMSHRC at 816, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1223.
663 F.2d at 1226 (Solvetir, J., dissenting).
3 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974) (quoting Gateway Coal
Co. v. UMWA, 446 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3d Cir. 1972) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2)'(1981). This is very similar to the definition of
"imminent danger" under the Mine Act. An imminent danger is a condition which
can reasonably be expected to cause death or serious bodily harm before it can
be corrected. 30 U.S.C. § 802(j) (Supp. IV 1980). A federal inspector who discovers
an imminent danger may order the immediate closure of the mine. 30 U.S.C. 5
817 (Supp. IV 1980). Under OSHA, the inspector must first secure an injunction
in federal district court. 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976). In sustaining the regulations pro-
viding a right to refuse to work under OSHA, the Supreme Court placed par-
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primary justification for the right to refuse to work. As the Com-
mission stressed in Pasula, "the right ... [to notify MSHA of
safety or health problems] would be hollow indeed ... if before
the regular statutory enforcement mechanisms could at least be
brought to bear, the condition complained of caused the very in-
jury that the Act was intended to prevent."''85 Therefore, it seems
safe to say that there must be a risk of an immediate injury. 6
ticular importance on the requirements that the employee must have "no
reasonable other alternative" and the condition must be "highly dangerous."
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12, 19 (1980). Clearly, the Commission
in Pasula was willing to accept a lower quantum of risk to support a refusal to
work. The next level of risk below an imminent danger is the statutory scheme
is a "significant and substantial" violation. 30 U.S.C. § 814(d) (Supp. IV 1980). Asked
to clarify this term, the Commission responded that a violation is significant and
substantial if "there exists a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed
to will result in an injury or illness of a reasonably serious nature." Secretary
of Labor v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Corp., 3 FMSHRC 822, 825, 2 MSHC (BNA)
1201, 1203 (1981).
Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mining Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1974) is commonly thought to repudiate the notion that the right to refuse to
work in a mine is conditioned on the existence of an imminent danger. However,
the court thought Phillips was confronted with "a chronic, long-term threat to
his health or safety," i.e,, black lung disease. Id. at 780. The evidence relied upon
by the court for this conclusion was not discussed.
' 2 FMSHRC at 2790, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1004. See also supra text accompany-
ing note 35. This language strongly suggests that the right of a miner to refuse
to work is extinguished once the condition complained of has been inspected by
MSHA. If this is so, then the right to refuse to work can be more simply and
objectively applied than it is now. The succeeding footnote elaborates on this point.
The approaches taken under the Mine Act, the Labor Act, and OSHA leave
both employers and employees uncertain of each other's rights in a dispute con-
cerning hazardous working conditions. Only after the fact, when a group of lawyers
have passed on the reasonableness of his conduct, can an employee be sure he
engaged in protected activity. Moreover, whether the employee's conduct was
reasonable often turns on complex technical issues which are difficult for most
attorneys to grasp.
There is an alternative that restores the bond between the right to refuse
to work and the right to obtain a federal inspection from which the former was
derived. We suggest that an employee should have the right to refuse to work
if: (1) he honestly beleives that the job to which he is assigned endangers his
safety or health; (2) he agrees to remain on the premises available for alternate
work, with the understanding that he will not be'paid if he does not work; and,
(3) he agrees to call for a federal inspection. Unlike the present standards, this
set of rules can be applied with certainty as soon as the dispute arises. Under
our test, an employer would bear the burden of disproving good faith belief, and
an employee, if he wished to be paid for not working, would have to prove a
discriminatory intent on the employer's part to deny alternative work. The
employee's right to refuse to work ends when: (1) he accepts alternate work; (2)
federal officials notify him that they will not conduct an inspection; (3) a federal
16
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The Commission also declined to decide whether a miner claim-
ing the right to refuse to work must first seek management's
assistance in correcting the condition. Under the corresponding
provision of OSHA, an employee must give his employer this
opportunity." In Robinette, the Commission concluded that,
whether or not it was required, Robinette had satisfied this stan-
dard by making repeated requests for assistance and waiting ten-
fifteen minutes for help.' A recent Commission decision adds a
requirement that a miner who refuses to perform his work must
ordinarily attempt to make his health or safety complaint known
to his employer prior to or reasonable soon after his work refusal.'
The Commission did, however, decide that a miner can do more
than passively refuse to work and still retain the protections of
the Mine Act. There was evidence that after ceasing work, Rob-
inette shut down a belt conveyor and the machine which fed coal
into it. "As with reasonable belief," declared the Commission, "a
miner need only demonstrate that his affirmative action was a
reasonable approach under the circumstances to eliminating or
protecting against the perceived hazard."9 In view of the court
of appeals decision in Pasula, this Commission holding would seem
to be on shaky ground.
A troublesome aspect of the right to refuse to work is that
it may conflict with the national policy favoring resolution of in-
dustrial disputes through collective bargaining. The long-
established "presumption of arbitrability" applies to safety
disputes as well as other disputes over working conditions.9 1 One
of the central tenets of the arbitration process is "work now,
grieve later."92 In firing Pasula, for example, the company was
inspector notifies him that he will not issue a citation or order based on the con-
dition complained of; or (4) a citation or order issued by the inspector is terminated,
whichever comes first.
In essence, this scheme places the decision on the reasonableness of the
employee's conduct in the more objective hands of a federal inspector.
, 29 C.F.R. 5 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
3 FMSHRC at 816, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1223.
Secretary of Labor ex reL. Dunmire and Estle v. Northern Coal Co., 4
FMAHRC 126,2 MSHC (BNA) 1585 (1982). The requirement that the alleged hazard
be communicated to management is limited to instances where such communica-
tion is "reasonably possible." Id. at 133, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1590.
FMSHRC at 816, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1220.
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368, 379 (1974). See also section
203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
9"F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, How ARBITRATION WORKS, 154,671 (3d ed. 1973).
There is an exception to this principle for safety disputes but only where the
1982] 1039
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acting wholly within its contractual rights. The discharge, in fact,
was upheld in arbitration. 3
The Commission avoided this issue in Pasula by holding that
the contractual and statutory rights to refuse to work were in-
dependent of each other. 4 But it may not always be possible to
treat them as independent. For example, an entire shift may refuse
to work because the miners object to riding in rail cars which
they believe are not safe. A grievance is filed but the miners will
not return to work. The mine is covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement with a no-strike clause. The company sues the union
under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act seek-
ing damages and injunction. 5 The union then files a complaint with
MSHA alleging a violation of section 105(c). Should the district
court grant this injunction? Assuming the miners return to work
after an adverse decision from the arbitrator, should the district
court award damages to the company? And how should the Com-
mission respond to the claim of discrimination?
These difficult issues are bound to arise in the future. A case
similar to the above hypothetical, in fact, has already been decided.
In Segedi ex rel. Ezarik v. Bethlehem Mines Corp.," an entire shift
refused to work for nearly an hour while the mine elevator's doors
were malfunctioning. The ALJ found that the company's refusal
to pay -the miners for the time consumed in a lawful work stop-
page under the Mine Act was a violation of section 105(c). 7 If the
strike had persisted, it might have compelled the ALJ to face
squarely some of the issues set out above.
employee can produce objective evidence of a serious and unusual safety or health
hazard.
2 FMSHRC at 2788, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1003.
" Id. at 2795, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1007.
" See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
3 FMSHRC 764, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1336 (1981).
Id. at 788. The Whirlpool Court, which upheld the right to refuse to work
under OSHA, stressed that the Secretary of Labor's regulations did not require
employers to pay workers who exercise their right to refuse to work. On re-
mand, however, the district court held that the employees must be compensated
for time spent not working since they were not given an opportunity to perform
safe alternate work. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 9 OSHC (BNA) 1038 (1980). Of
course, it does not always follow that an employee must be paid while exercising
a statutory right. The Labor Act guarantees'the right to strike, but employees
who exercise that right not only do not have to be paid but may be permanently
replaced. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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We raise these questions only to provoke thought on the mat-
ter; we do not pretend to have the answers. Supreme Court prece-
dent suggests that two statutes should be reconciled if possible. 8
If legislative history provides no basis for reconciliation, then a
policy decision must be made as to which statute ought to prevail.
Whether the Court in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA99 rejected
Justice Douglas's view that Congress preempted the field of mine
safety and health when it legislated on the subject"' is uncertain.
It seems to us that accommodations between the Mine Act and
the Labor Act will have to be fashioned on a case by case basis.10'
Who Can Be Liable?
Section 105(c) is sweeping in its reach. Its prohibitions extend
not only to employers but to "[a]ny person." "Person" is defined
in section 3(f)"'0 as "any individual, partnership, association, cor-
poration, firm, subsidiary of a cororation or other organization."
The word "person" as used in the anti-discrimination provision
of OSHA has been interpreted by the Secretary of Labor to in-
clude "such entities as organizations representing employees for
collective bargaining purposes, employment agencies, or any other
person in a position to discriminate."'0 3
The focus of the prohibition on persons in a position to
discriminate was adopted in Local 9800, UMWA v. Secretary of
Labor.' MSHA's motion to dismiss the complaint of discrimina-
tion filed against it was denied, and MSHA was held to be a person
subject to the provisions of section 105(c). It was reasoned that
the aim of fostering a working environment receptive to safety
complaints is similar to the aim under the Labor Act of ensuring
" Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976); United
States v. National Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
414 U.S. 368 (1974).
Id. at 394 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
'0' Perhaps it will be unnecessary to further refine these issues. The Third
Circuit's decision in Pasu/a emphasized that the right to refuse work is a right
personal to a miner faced with an unsafe condition. "There is no right in the
Act to shut down an entire shift's work." 663 F.2d at 1219. However, it may
be argued that if an entire shift is exposed to a serious danger, the entire shift
may claim the right to refuse to work.
' 30 U.S.C. 802(f) (1976).
'o 29 C.F.R. § 1977.4 (1981).
'' 2 FMSHRC 2680, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1077 (1980).
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"laboratory conditions" for union representation elections."' 5 The
source of a threat to this environment was thus thought irrelevant.
Liability may even extend to one never charged with
discrimination. In Munsey v. Smitty Baker Coal Co.,' the Com-
mission decided that a successor employer could be ordered to
reinstate and reimburse a miner wrongfully fired by its
predecessor. The Commission relied on Golden State Bottling Co.
v. NLRB," in which the Supreme Court held that the Board's
power to direct "such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate
the policies of this act""0 8 sanctioned a remedial order against a
successor employer. The Commission's power to "grant such relief
as it deems appropriate"' °9 is indistinguishable.
The exercise of this power, naturally, must be subject to ra-
tional standards. The following factors were held by the Commis-
sion to govern resolution of the successorship issue:
1) [W]hether the successor company had notice of the charge,
2) the ability of the predecessor to provide relief, 3) whether
there has been a substantial continuity of business operations,
4) whether the new employer uses the same plant, 5) whether
he uses the same or substantially the same work force, 6)
whether he uses the same or substantially the same supervisory
personnel, 7) whether the same jobs exist under substantially
the same working conditions, 8)' whether he uses the ,same
machinery, equipment and methods of production and 9) whether
he produces the same product.110
Procedure
Hearing and pre-hearing procedure is governed by the Com-
mission's Rules of Procedure.' No particular form of Complaint
is required, as long as it contains a short and plain statement of
105 2 FMSHRC at 2684, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1078.
2 FMSHRC 3463, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1052 (1980); appeal docketed, No. 82-1079
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1981).
1" 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
108 29 U.S.C. 160(c).(1976).
'o 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2), (c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
"o 2 FMSHRG at 3465, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1054 (quoting from EEOC v. Mac-
Millan Bloedel Containers. Inc.. 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974)).
" 29 C.F.R. §5 2700.1, et seq. (1981). Any procedural question not governed
by the Mine Act or the Commission's rules is governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29 C.F.R. S 2700.1(b) (1981).
The Mine Act expressly delegates to the Commission only the power to prescribe
1042 [Vol. 84
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the facts and a statement of the relief requested."' The person
charged with discrimination (the respondent) must answer the
Complaint within thirty days."' The Answer need only identify
the case and briefly explain the respondent's position. If either
a complainant or a respondent fails to comply with the rules, an
order to show cause will issue before the entry of a dismissal or
a default. Anyone may be permitted to represent a party before
the Commission, but the representative will be held to "the stan-
dards of ethical conduct required of practitioners in the courts
of the United States. 1 1 5
By an anomalous requirement, discovery must be initiated
within twenty days after a complaint is filed, "6 although the
Answer need not be filed until thirty days after filing the Com-
plaint. The time for discovery may be extended for good cause,
however.1 Discovery should be completed sixty days after a Com-
plaint is filed."8
rules governing review of ALJ decisions. 30 U.S.C. S 823(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
However, Congress must have intended that the power vested in the Secretary
of Interior to issue regulations governing adjudications, in 5 508 of the Coal Act,
carrying over to the Commission. 30 U.S.C § 961(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Congress
also declared in § 105(d) of the Mine Act that the "rules of procedure prescribed
by the Commission shall provide affected miners or representatives of affected
miners an opportunity to participate as parties to hearings under this section."
30 U.S.C. 5 815(d) (Supp. IV 1980). This naturally implies that the Commission
is empowered to prescribe rules of procedure for .hearings.
112 29 C.F.R. § 2700.42 (1981). If the Secretary of Labor decides there has
been a violation of 5 105(c), he must "immediately file" a complaint with the Com-
mission. If the miner is proceeding on his own, he must "file" a complaint within
30 days of "notice" of the Secretary's determination that there has been no viola-
tion. Filing is effective upon receipt by the Commission, or upon mailing by cer-
tified or registered mail. 29 C.F.R. 5 2700.5(d) (1981). The meaning of "notify"
is far from clear. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a person is notified
of EEOC's determination on his complaint when he receives the notification. Reeves
v. American Optical Co., 408 F. Supp. 297, 301 (W.D.N.Y. 1976). However, the
Commission has held that MSHA is notified of a mine operator's intent to con-
test a proposed civil penalty when the operator mails the notice of contest.
Secretary of Labor v. J.P. Burroughs & Son, Inc., 3 FMSHRC 854, 2 MSHC (BNA)
1275 (1981). The rule seems to be that "notify" should be construed to preserve
a party's procedural rights.
113 29 C.F.R. § 2700.42 (1981).
'1' Id. at S 2700.63(a).
Id. at § 2700.3, 2700.80(a).
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The Commission's most controversial rule of procedure con-
erns withholding the identity of miner witnesses and informants.
Rule 59 provides:
A Judge shall not, until 2 days before a hearing, disclose
or order a person to disclose to an operator or his agent the
name of a miner who is expected by the Judge to testify or whom
a party expects to summon or call as a witness. A Judge shall
not, except in extraordinary circumstances, disclose or order a
person to disclose to an operator or his agent the name of an
informant who is a miner."9
By its terms, the rule limits only the power of the ALJ; it does
not prevent parties from voluntarily disclosing the names of
witnesses or informants. The rule may be invoked by applying
for a protective order.
The rule's first sentence absolutely bars disclosure of the
names of miner witnesses. It is patterned on the NLRB's rule
barring disclosure of the statements of witnesses or informants
prior to a hearing,ln which, in turn, is modeled on the Jencks Act.121
In permitting disclosure two days prior to a hearing, it is less
restrictive than the Jencks Act, which permits the government
to retain pre-trial statements until the witness who made the state-
ment is called on direct examination."
The rule's second sentence is based on the qualified privilege
which the Secretary of Labor claims in proceedings under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and OSHA.12 Names and statements of in-
formants will not be disclosed unless the requesting party can
demonstrate a .substantial need for them.124
Both parts of the rule were invoked and upheld in an
"' Id. at S 2700.59.
29 C.F.R. S 102.118(a) (1981).
18 U.S.C. S 3500 (Supp. II 1978).
12 Id.
11 E.g., Brennan v. Engineered Products, Inc., 506 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1974);
Quality Stamping Products, 7 OSHC (BNA) 1285 (1979).
12 506 F.2d at 303, 7 OSHC (BNA) at 1287 n.5. The privilege is grounded
on FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(3). The word "informant" is commonly understood to refer
to a person who provides information to the government. Thus, it is doubtful
that anyone except the Secretary of Labor could claim a privilege of nondisclosure
under this part of Commission Rule 59.
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unreported civil penalty ruling, MSHA v. Domtar Industries, Inc.'
It was also held that the rule protects statements of miner wit-
nesses and informants, as well as their names.
In resolving a procedural question not governed by the Com-
mission's rules, the Mine Act or the Administrative Procedure
Act, the Commission will be guided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.'26 The motion to dismiss is a common example. The
Federal Rules may also be sources for additional forms of action,
such as declaratory judgments and class actions, though neither
device has been used in the discrimination area.
Hearing sites must be selected with due regard for the con-
venience and necessity of the parties and their witnesses.'" At
the hearing, any evidence that is relevant and not unduly repe-
titious or cumulative is admissible.'
Direct evidence of discrimination is usually difficult to pro-
duce. Many cases present the mixed motive problem: the com-
plainant may have been subjected to discrimination, or treated
differently than others, but unprotected activity as well as pro-
tected activity may have motivated the adverse action of which
he complains. 30 To deal with this problem, the Commission has
allocated the burdens of proof in a discrimination case as follows:
We hold that the complainant has established a prima facie
case of a violation of section 105(c)(1) if a preponderance of the
evidence proves (1) that he engaged in a protected activity, and
(2) that the adverse action was motivated in any part by the
protected activity. On these issues, the complainant must bear
11 No. CENT 81-2-M (February 10, 1981) (protective order).
12 29 C.F.R. S 2700.1(b) (1981).
" Other possibilities are consolidation/severance, interpleader, impleader,
and substitution of parties.
'=' 29 C.F.R. § 2700.51 (1981).
' Commission rules, unlike those of the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, do not refer to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Compare 29
C.F.R. § 2200.72 (1981).
11 This should be distinguished from the "pretext" case in which the employer
advances a legitimate business reason for his action which proves to be a sham
upon examination, since the employer did not rely upon it at all. Wright Line,
251 N.L.R.B. 150 (1980), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1612 (1982). See also Truesdale, Recent Trends
at the NLRB and in the Courts, 32 LABOR L.J. 131 (1981).
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the ultimate burden of persuasion. The employer may affirma-
tively defend, however, by proving by a preponderance of all
the evidence that, although part of his motive was unlawful, (1)
he was also motivated by the miner's unprotected activities, and
(2) that he would have taken adverse action against the miner
in any event for the unprotected activities alone.
131
These tests are based on the Supreme Court decision in Mt.
Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,"2 which involved an
employee who alleged he had been fired for engaging in activ-
ities protected by the First Amendment. Similar tests are followed
under the National Labor Relations Act 13 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act." 4 In Robinette, the Commission made it plain
that the ultimate burden of proving a violation of section 105(c)
never shifts from the complainant. 3 '
131 Pasula, 2 FMSHRC 2786, 2799-2800 (1980), rev'd sub nor. Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Marshall, 633 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Marshall v. Commonwealth
Aquarium, 469 F. Supp, 690 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 611 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979). In Robinette,
the Commission held that a mine operator meets its Pasula burden even if pro-
tected activity was the leading or primary ground for adverse action, as long
as other instances of unprotected activity were sufficient grounds. 3 FMSHRC
at 819. This suggests that § 105(c) is not necessarily violated when protected ac-
tivity is the "straw that breaks the camel's back" and leads to discipline or
discharge.
" NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1981).
" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
" 3 FMSHRC at 818,2 MSHC (BNA) at 1224. See also Brazell v. Island Creek
Coal Co., 3 FMSHRC 1773 (1981). The intermediate burden placed on the employer,
however, seems more onerous than that placed on a defendant under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, who needs only to produce evidence that the adverse
action was motivated by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant
need not prove that it was actually motivated by the proferred reasons. Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Under the Mine Act,
the employer does have to make this showing. Moreover, "[iut is not sufficient
for the employer to show that the miner deserved to have been fired... The
employer must show that he did in fact consider the employee deserving of
discipline for engaging in the unprotected activity alone and that he would have
disciplined him in any event." Pasula, 2 FMSHRC at 2800, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1010.
Proof of the absence of disparate treatment may be one of the few methods an
employer can use to meet this burden. This contrasts sharply with Title VII cases,
where proof of disparte treatment is typically the foundation of plaintiff's prima
facie case. However, a recent decision indicates that the Commission may be drift-
ing away from the Pasula formula toward the more lenient Burdine test. In
Secretary of Labor ex rel. Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 3 FMSHRC 2508, 2 MSHC
(BNA) 1505 (1981) appeal filed, No. 81-2300 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 1981), the Commis-
sion reversed an ALJ's finding of discrimination because the ALJ delved too
24
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Whether to grant review of an ALJ's decision is a matter of
Commission discretion. 3 ' A final order of the Commission is
reviewable in the courts of appeals. ' The findings of the Com-
mission on questions of fact shall be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence." If no petition for review is filed within forty
days of an ALJ's order or within thirty days of the Commission's
order, the findings of fact and order in the case "shall be conclu-
sive with respect to any petition for enforcement which is filed
by the Secretary." '39
Defenses
Once a miner establishes a prima facie case, the respondent
may defend by claiming that the adverse action would have been
imposed for unprotected activities alone. " ' Unprotected activity
is a general term covering the kinds of misconduct familar to per-
sonnel managers: absenteeism, tardiness, loafing, fighting,
horseplay, insubordination, incompetence, dishonesty, theft, intox-
ication, and so on. A mine operator that establishes, publishes,
and enforces work rules in a uniform manner is more likely to
deeply into the mine operator's business justification for suspending a miner.
"Once it appears that a proferred business justification is not plainly incredible
or implausible, a finding of pretext is inappropriate. We and our judges should
not substitute for the operator's business judgment our views on 'good' business
practice or on whether a particular adverse action was 'just' or 'wise.'" Id. at
2516, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1511. Since the employer's motive in imposing the discipline
is the basic issue, as a dissenting opinion pointed out, Id- at 2519, 2 MSHC (BNA)
at 1512, it is difficult, when the issue of disparte treatment is raised, to justify
avoiding or "limiting" an inquiry into the alleged business jusification for the
discipline.
'- 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). An unreviewed decision of the ALJ
is not a precedent binding on the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.73. (1981).
37 30 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. IV 1980).
13I !d.
15I !d.
1 This is the most common defense. The respondent may also defend by
proving it was unaware of the miner's protected activities, Secretary of Labor
ex rel. Bishop v. Mountain Top Fuel, Inc., 2 FMSHRC 1126, 1 MSHC (BNA) 2470
(1980), or that he voluntarily quit and was not discharged, Mullins v. Eastover
Mining Co., 2 FMSHRC 2715, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1079 (1980), or that he was laid
off pursuant to contractually mandated procedures, McCracken v. Valley Camp
Coal Co., 2 FMSHRC 928, 1 MSHC (BNA) 2503 (1980), or that the mine operator
thoroughly investigated the miner's complaint and took reasonable corrective ac-
tion. Secretary of Labor ex rel. Bennett v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 3 FMSHRC
1539, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1424 (1981).
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be successful in rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination than
one without explicit and consistent personnel practices.
The above defenses are of course particularly applicable to
mine operators, the usual respondents in section 105(c) cases. In
cases where other organizations, such as unions, employment
agencies or outside individuals are respondents, the defenses will
be analogous. Special problems are sure to arise in such cases,
however. For example, it has been held that potentially coercive
remarks under section 105(c) uttered by a public employee to a
union official must be weighed against the public employee's free
speech rights."'
The impact of the doctrine of fair representation on mine safe-
ty discrimination cases is uncertain."' Assume, for example, that
a union representing a miner refuses to process his grievance con-
cerning a safety issue to arbitration. The miner may claim that
the union interfered with his right to make a safety complaint.
The union may have believed the complaint to be meritorious but
may have decided to withdraw it in exchange for the employer's
satisfaction of a grievance concerning the wage provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement. So long as the union made "an
honest effort to serve the interest of all [unit] members, without
hostility to any [and] subject always to complete good faith,14
there is no violation of the duty of fair representation. But is this
an affirmative defense to a section 105(c) claim, particularly if the
union has successfully defended a suit by the miner allegeing a
breach of that duty? Only more experience under the Mine Act
will supply the answer.
This hypothetical raises an important issue: should a decision
in another forum affect one's section 105(c) claim or defense? Res
judicata and collateral estoppel have been interposed frequently
by respondents relying upon a decision adverse to the miner in
arbitration or state administrative proceedings. To date, the Com-
mission has declined to apply these doctrines, but has cautiously
endorsed a limited form of deference to prior decision involving
the same parties.
"4 Local 9800, UMWA v. Secretary of Labor, 3 FMSHRC 958,2 MSHC (BNA)
1077 (1981).
1,2 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
1 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964) (quoting Ford Motor Co.
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State agencies commonly deal with issues which may affect
a section 105(c) claim. A state unemployment compensation board
may have to decide whether a miner was discharged for "cause"
to determine his eligibility for benefits. Similarly, a state agency
which administers a statute nearly identical to section 105(c), such
as the West Virginia Coal Mine Safety Board of Appeals,' may
have to determine whether unprotected activity was the
motivating factor in a miner's discharge. Must the Commission
defer to decisions handed down in such cases?
We think not. As a preliminary matter, it may be doubtful
whether res judicata and collateral estoppel can apply.4 5 The ra-
tionale behind these doctrines is that a litigant who has once had
an opportunity to advance every argument in his support may
be justly barred from doing so again.' Administrative agencies
are unlike courts of general jurisdiction, however. A complainant
before the West Virginia Coal Mine Safety Board of Appeals, to
return to the example cited above, has no opportunity to have
his section 105(c) claim litigated expressly. Without that oppor-
tunity, we believe that the Commission should not defer to the
Board's decision. Moreover, unlike courts of general jurisdiction,
the Commission is a specialized body charged by Congress with
overseeing a particular piece of legislation. The NLRB, in an
analogous situation, has always reserved to itself the power to
differ with the views of an arbitrator or a state agency.'47
In the final analysis, the issue is one of legislative intent.'
It is clear that Congress intended "to accord parallel or overlapp-
ing remedies against discrimination"'4 under the Mine Act.
Although states may supplement federal efforts, to the extent
that the Commission disagrees with a determination made under
state law, the Commission's view must prevail.
', See W. VA. CODE S 22-1-21(a) (1981).
See Pettus v. American Airlines, 587 F.2d 627, 633-35 (4th Cir. 1978) (dissent-
ing opinion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979).
"' F. JAMES & C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.7 (2d ed. 1977).
14 See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964); NLRB
v. Stafford Trucking, Inc. 371 F.2d 244, 249 (7th Cir. 1966).
148 Cf. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Washman v. J.C. Penney
Co., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 638 (D. Del. 1981).
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47.
Congress' pre-emptive intent is clear. Senator Williams, one of the Act's
principal sponsors, stated during the legislative debates that "[flew subject areas
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However, the decision of a state tribunal should be entitled
to some weight as a matter of evidence. In connection with the
decision of labor arbitrators, the Commission in Pasula rejected
both the idea that arbitral findings should be controlling and the
more limited form of post-arbitral deference endorsed by the
NLRB."5' Instead the Commission held that an arbitrator's deci-
sion may be admitted as evidence, and that its weight will de-
pend on, inter alia, the congruence of the statutory and contrac-
tual rights, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum,
adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of discrimina-
tion, and the special competence of the particular arbitrator."2
The difficulty with this view is that it does not address the
basic problem created by a multiplicity of proceedings. While the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may be inap-
plicable to Commission proceedings, the policies underlying them
should figure in all litigation: the need to have matters finally
determined and the need to conserve the resources of the parties
and. the adjudicatory system. A creative complainant might sue
in three, four or five different fora on essentially the same com-
plaint. Barring a major legislative initiative, such as the creation
of an Article III Labor Court,' 3 this situation is likely to persist.
involve a stronger Federal interest, historically and constitutionally, than the
Nation's mineral and energy resources, and the lives, health, and safety of the
miners who work in this hazardous profession." LEG. HIST., supra note 1, at
1030. The role for states to play in this scheme is equally clear:
"I say we can improve the safety and health of miners if we have the
minimum standards that apply to everybody equally and are uniformly
enforced, and then let states reach those areas they feel the minimum
standards do not reach and, for the protection of the workers in that
state, impose stronger or supplemental standards."
Id. at 1034.
151 The Board will not relitigate unfair labor practice issues already decided
by an arbitrator if the proceedings before the arbitrator appear to have been
fair and regular, all parties agreed to be bound and the decision of the arbitrator
is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Labor Act. Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). The Board shows an increasing reluctance
to defer to arbitral decisions in which the unfiar labor practice issues were not
specifically raised or addressed. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 2 (1980).
Deference to arbitral decisions has been approved by the courts, most recently
in NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 105 LRRM 2765 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Associated
Press v. N.L.R.B., 492 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
152 2 FMSHRC at 2795, 2 MSHC (BNA) at 1007 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)).
15 See MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF TH NLRB 132 et seq. (1977).
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The Commission, however, should continue to explore the feasibil-
ity of administrative deference.'-
If a miner accepts an arbitral award, the effect on his section
105(c) case is unsettled. Acceptance of such an award while pro-
ceeding as a private party under section 105(c)(3) may be a defense
to complaint. However, when the Secretary of Labor sues in his
behalf under section 105(c)(2), a public right is also being
vinlicated, and precedent strongly suggests that the miner's
acceptance of the award will not bar the action.1"
Remedies
If the Commission rules in favor of a complainant, it may grant
"Lsuch relief as it deems appropriate, including, but not limited
to, an order requiring the rehiring or reinstatement of the miner
to his former position with back pay and interest or such remedy
as may be appropriate."'- This provision is modeled on the NLRB's
power to remedy discrimination, which has been copied in other
employment-related statutes as well."' The typical order will direct
a mine operator to reinstate the miner, reimburse him for lost
wages and benefits, post the decision and expunge any reference
to the adverse action from the miner's personnel file.'
An ALJ's decision in a discrimination case is not reviewable
by the Commission until an award is made. 59 There is a presump-
11 One approach would be to encourage the use of sworn, transcribed
testimony from other proceedings. This would not necessarily abrogate the
usefulness of live testimony but should make it easier to determine just what
issues of fact are genuinely in dispute. Rule 32(aX3) of the FED. R. Civ. P. expresses
an analogous policy. It recognizes that "exceptional circumstances" may warrant
substituting depositions for the testimony of witnesses in open court. For fur-
ther discussion, see Note, Res Judicata in Successive Employment Discrimination
Suits, 1980 U. ILL. L. FORUM 1049.
" Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. McLean
Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975).
1" 30 U.S.C. 5 815(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). In addition to securing enforcement
of orders an decisions in the courts of appeals, the Secretary is authorized to
seek injunctions in district courts to aid compliance with such orders and deci-
sions. 30 U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. IV 1980).
-Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975) (concerning
remedies under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(E) et seq).
' See Howard v. Martin-Marietta, 3 FMSHRC 1599, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1445
(1981).
"' Council of the S. Mountains, Inc. v. Martin County Coal Corp., 2 FMSHRC
3216, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1058 (1980).
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tion under analogous statutes favoring back pay," which should
reflect total earnings, including overtime, premium pay, automatic
raises and fringe benefits.61 The Commission has included vaca-
tion pay as part of "backpay."'6' If medical expenses would have
been covered by employer-provided insurance, the respondent may
be ordered to reimburse the complainant for such expenses."
Back pay equals the pay the complainant would have earned
minus interim earnings. The employer is responsible for with-
holding the amounts required by state or federal laws and for
paying any additional contributions which those laws may
require.' Public assistance and unemployment benefits received
while off work will not be deducted, since these payments may
be recoverable by the state.' Interest will be ordered paid on
the back pay award at the rate used by the Internal Revenue
Service for underpayments and overpayments of tax.'
Laches may bar all or part of a back pay claim. 1' Amounts
which could have been earned with reasonable diligence, as well
16 Cf. Albemrle, 422 U.S. at 405 (1975). The Commission explicitly adopted
the presumption favoring back pay under the Mine Act in Secretary of Labor
ex rel. Gooslin v. Kentucky Carbon Corp., 4 FMSHRC 1, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1570 (1982).
"' Cf. NLRB v. U.S. Air Conditioning Corp., 336 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1964);
Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977).
1 Secretary of Labor ex rel Dunmire v. N. Coal Co., 4 FMSHRC 126,2 MSHC
(BNA) 1585 (1982). This decision also affirmed an ALJ's back award which in-
cluded "incidental personal hearing expenses" incurred by the complaining miners.
Id. at 1596-97 (the miners did not have legal expenses since they were represented
by the Solicitor of Labor).
18 Culp v. General American Transp. Corp., 517 F.2d 1404 (6th Cir, 1975).
18 Back pay proceedings can be complex and time-consuming. So far, Com-
mission cases have only begun to explore its many facets. The NLRB has highly
refined back pay procedures developed over the past 40 years. See 3 NLRB
CASEHANDLING MANUAL 5§ 10530.1, et seq. (1977).
" Neal v. Boich, 3 FMSHRC 443, 453, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1225 (1981). Accord,
NLRB v. Pan Scape Corp., 607 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977). Contra EEOC v. Enterprise Assoc.
Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542 F.2d 579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied in 430
U.S. 911 (1977).
18 Howard v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 3 FMSHRC 1599, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1445
(1981); Flordia Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 117 (1977). The current rate, effective as
this article was written, was 12% per annum. Rev. Rul. 79-366, 1979-2 C.B. 402.
187 Cf. Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977).
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as actual interim earnings, will be deducted.' Periods of unavail-
ability, for example, during an illness, may also reduce the award. 9
In cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, courts
have occasionally awarded "front pay" when the violation was
found particularly egregious.170 This compensates the complainant
for loss of future earnings until promoted. Whether this remedy
is available under section 105(c) has not been determined at this
time.
A troublesome issue is whether special or compensatory
damages may be awarded. The legislative history declares that
"recompense for any special damages" should be granted.'' Yet
it is generally held that compensatory damages cannot be recov-
ered under statutes of this kind since the remedial provisions are
equitable in nature.' Damages for emotional distress, loss of value,
pain and suffering and the like are legal in nature and the respon-
dent may claim it is entitled to a jury trial on these issues. The
Supreme Court has held, however, that if Congress commits the
enforcement of a public right to an administrative agency, a jury
trial may properly be denied even if one would be required were
the case tried to a court.'73
In one respect, the remedial portions of section 105(c) differ
"I Cf. Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB
v. Robert Haws Co., 403 F.2d 979, 981 (6th Cir. 1968).
I Cf. 0stapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 401 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied in 429 U.S. 1041 (1976). Back pay will also be cut off as of the date
an employee would have been laid off or terminated. Cf. NLRB v. Columbia Tribune
Publishing Co., 495 F.2d 1384, 1393 (8th Cir. 1974.
,70 White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1091 (4th Cir. 1977).
See also East Texas Steel Castings Co., 116 NLRB 1336 (1956).
" S. REP., supra note 6, at 37, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEWS
at 3437.
"' Consol. Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938). Such damages are
available, however, under other civil rights statutes. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247 (1978) (42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976)). Johnson v. Ry. Express, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,
460 (1975) (42 U.S.C. S 1981 (1976)). Not every award of money damages is
necessarily "legal" in nature. Back pay, for example, has been said to be essen-
tially equitable relief since it merely compels a party to disgorge funds wrongful-
ly withheld. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).
" Atlas Roofing v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977). Special damages con-
sisting of lost equity in a truck were awarded in Luck Quarries, 2 FMSHRC 954,
1 MSHC (BNA) 2426 (1980).
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markedly from other statutes. A violator may be assessed a civil
penalty.17 Congress, however, seems to have given little thought
to how such a penalty is to be assessed. The Secretary of Labor
typically adds a claim for civil penalties to his prayer for relief
in a section 105(c) complaint. Not surprisingly, miners who bring
their own cases to the Commission tend to be unaware that civil
penalities may be imposed. The problem is that civil penalties
under the Mine Act are intended for violations of mandatory safety
and health standards and the regulations governing their im-
position do not fit in a discrimination case."'
MSHA regulations allow a mine operator the opportunity to
secure informal review of penalty assessments before the Com-
mission becomes involved. After a citation is issued by an inspec-
tor, it is reviewed by an assessor who assigns what he believes
is an appropriate penalty. The operator, upon receiving the results
of this review, may request a conference with MSHA adminis-
trative personnel and changes in the penalty can be negotiated.
After the conference process, MSHA sends the operator a pro-
posed assessment. Within thirty days, the operator must either
pay the assessment or request a formal hearing with the
Commission.
Can a Commission ALJ impose a civil penalty after finding
a violation of section 105(c)(1) without allowing the operator a
chance to avail itself of these procedures? The answer is probably no.
17' "Violations by any person of paragraph (1) shall be subject to the provi-
sions of sections 108 [818] and 110(a) [820(a)]." 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3) (Supp IV 1980).
Section 108 provides for injunctions to enforce orders or decisions issued under
the Mine Act. 30 U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 110(a) directs the Secretary
of Labor to assess a penalty for each violation of a mandatory safety or health
standard. 30 U.S.C. 5 820(a) (Supp. IV 1980). From this, it might be argued that
only MSHA, not the Commission, may assess a penalty for a violation of S 105(c)(1).
However, S 110(i) is broad enough to incorporate § 110(a). It declares that "[tihe
Commission shall have authority to assess all civil penalties provided in this chapter
[Act]." 30 U.S.C. S 820(i) (Supp. IV 1980). Although civil penalties are expressly
authorized only for violations of § 105(c)(1), a penalty has been imposed for the
failure to obey an order of temporary reinstatement issued pursuant to S 105(c)(2).
Secretary of Labor ex rel. Bishop v. Mountain Top Fuel, Inc., 2 FMSHRC 1126,
1 MSHC (BNA) 2470 (1980).
"' See 30 C.F.R. §5 100.1, et seq. (1981). The procedures described in these
regulations are available only to mine operators. Section 105(c) extends to any
"person." 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Whether this is an indication that
only operators can be assessed a civil penalty for violations of S 105(c)(1) is unsettled
at this writing.
17 30 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1981).
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The regulations described above specifically include alleged viola-
tions of section 105(c) within their scope."8 Commission interven-
tion is probably inevitable, since the operator would fear prejudice
to its defense in the discrimination case if it paid the proposed
assessment in the civil penalty case. But the procedures would
not necessarily be a hollow exercise. They might encourage set-
tlement and, as in civil penalty cases generally, MSHA's views
on the application of the statutory criteria may be helpful to the
Commission.
Still, the statutory criteria for penalty assessments are ill-
suited to discrimination cases. 7" The size of the business and the
operator's ability to pay, of course, should be considered. But in
evaluating the history of previous violations, should the ALJ con-
sider only violations of section 105(c) or violations of any statutory
or regulatory provision under the Mine Act? How can the ALJ
evaluate the operator's negligence when, as it universally the case
under section 105(c), the operator intended to take the adverse
action complained of? How is the "gravity" of the violation to be
measured since the damage done is essentially non-physical?
We think an operator is at least entitled to the civil penalty
procedures if it wants them. Of course, they may be waived but
the waiver should be apparent on the record. We also believe that
in fixing an appropriate penalty for a violation of section 105(c)(1),
the statutory criteria should be abandoned in favor of a set of
mitigating an aggravating factors which can be developed on a
case by case basis. The ALJ might consider, for example, whether
the miner was granted temporary reinstatement, whether the
operator's position was sustained in arbitration, whether the
discriminatory conduct was endorsed by company management,
and whether the miner specifically claimed the protection of the
Mine Act when he engaged in the protected activity.
Section 105(c)(2)
A complaint of discrimination may be brought before the Com-
mission by the Secretary of Labor (MSHA) or by the complaining
17 They are: "ITlhe operator's history of previous violations, the ap-
propriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the operator charged,
whether the operator was negligent, the effect on the operator's ability to con-
tinue in business, the gravity of the violation, and the demonstrated good faith
of the operator charged in attempting to achieve rapid compliance after notifica-
tion of a violation." 30 U.S.C. §§ 815(b)(1)(B), 820(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
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miner. In all cases, the Secretary investigates the complaint and,
if he finds a violation, files an action before the Commission on
the miner's behalf. If the Secretary decides there is no violation,
he notifies the miner who may then file a complaint with the Com-
mission under section 105(c)(3).
A miner who believes he is the victim of discrimination "may,
within sixty days after such violation occurs, file a complaint with
the Secretary. . . ."I" The word "may" is significant, for it has been
held that the filing periods are not jurisdictional."' Like statutes
of limitation, they may be waived for equitable reasons."7
The complaint may be filed at any MSHA office.' Once it
is filed, MSHA sends a copy to the respondent and commences
an investigation. The Secretary .must begin the investigation
within fifteen days and conclude it within ninety days, but, despite
the use of the mandatory "shall" in this passage of the statute,
the drafters declared that "these time frames are not intended
to be jurisdictional. The failure to meet any of them should not
result in the dismissal of the discrimination proceedings; the com-
plainant should not be prejudiced because of the failure of the
government to meet its time obligations."'81 Controversy over the
Secretary's timetable may be mooted by Commission Rule 40
which entitles the miner to file a complaint on his own behalf
ninety days after he complained to the Secretary, whether or not
the Secretary has made a determination on the complaint. '82
The Secretary must "immediately" file a complaint with the
Commission if he decides that a violation of section 105(c)(1) has
occurred. The miner may present additional evidence on his own
,a 30 U.S.C. § 815 815(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
17. Secretary of Labor ex rel. Bennett v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 3
FMSHRC 1539, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1424 (1981). See also Christian v. S. Hopkins Coal
Co., 1 FMSHRC 126, 134-36, 1 MSHC (BNA) 2073 (1979).
179 Id.
8 These offices are listed in the appendices of two excellent reference hand-
books for laymen: D. MCATEER, MINER'S MANUAL (1981); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT, A GUIDE TO MINER'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER
THE FEDERAL MINE AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977 (1980).
,81 S. REP., supra note 6, at 36, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 3436. It is commonly held that the government is less affected by the doctrine
of laches when enforcing a public right. Marshall v. Intermountain Elec. Co., 614
F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1980); Occidential Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977);
Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1963).
'a' 29 C.F.R. S 2700.40(b) (1981).
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behalf if he so desires.'" Further, Commission rules allow interven-
tion by other interested parties upon timely application. 4 The
Secretary, however, is in control of the action at all times and
may compromise it or withdraw it as he sees fit. Whether the
Secretary's conduct binds the complainant is unsettled. This is
the rule followed in similar cases, i85 but the drafter of the Mine
Act, according to the Senate Committee report, "intend[ed] to af-
ford a complainant the right to institute an action on his own behalf
before the Commission if the Secretary, in the exercise of his
discretion, settles a case brought under [section 105(c)(2)] on terms
unsatisfactory to the complainant.""' Commission rules do not pro-
vide for this contingency. If an action were brought by a miner
after the Secretary had filed a settlement on his behalf, a host
of difficult issues would emerge concerning the effect of the set-
tlement and the respondent's reliance thereon.187
The Secretary, if he prevails, may secure the same relief as
any prevailing party, described earlier. Complainants proceeding
on their own may receive attorneys' fees in addition to other relief.
The Mine Act does not provide for an award of attorneys' fees
29 C.F.R. 5 2700.4(b)(2) (1981).
"u Id. at 2700.4(c).
' See 7 AM. JUR. 2D, Attorney General. § 18 (1980). It has been held that an
employees desire to withdraw his unfair labor practice charge is not binding
on the General Counsel of the NLRB, nor is a union's waiver of back pay for
its members. Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1963). Analogously, the right
of employee representatives to elect party status in proceeding under OSHA does
not mean that they can continue to prosecute a citation after the Secretary of
Labor has withdrawn from the case. IMO Chemical Group, Inc. v. OSHRC, 1980
(CCH) 24,990. See also UAW v. OSHRC, 557 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1977). However,
the Commission has indicated that it will recognize greater autonomy in cases
nominally controlled by the Secretary of Labor. In Secretary of Labor ex rel.
Koerner v. Arch Mineral Coal Co., 1 FMSHRC 471, 1 MSHC (BNA) 1761 (1979),
the Commission insisted on the miner's written consent to a settlement agree-
ment before approving the Secretary's motion to dissolve an order of temporary
reinstatement.
I S. REP., supra note 6, at 37, reprintedfin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS
at 3437.
'" In Secretary of Labor ex rel. Gooslin v. Kentucky Carbon Corp., 3 FMSHRC
640 (1981), the Secretary sought to withdraw from the case after he had filed
a complaint with the Commission, based on a conflict of interest. The ALJ denied
the request to withdraw, stating that "Section 105(c)(2) clearly mandates MSHA
to prosecute a discharge case where it determines that section 105(c)(1) of the
Act has been violated." Id. at 652. Part of the ALJ's concern was that there is
no statutory or regulatory provision implementing the language of the drafters
cited in the text. He feared that the miner would be left in "limbo."
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to a prevailing respondent. However, the Equal Access to Justice
Act of 1980'1 may be a vehicle for such reimbursement. Under
certain conditions, a party prevailing against the goverment will
receive costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees "unless the ad-
judicating officer of the acency finds that the position of the agency
was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust." '89 This Act makes important amendments to the
Administrative Procedure Act and became effective in October
of 1981. Its potential impact on Commission proceedings is difficult
to assess at this writing.
It often happens that a complainant will file a complaint under
more than one act. Nothing in section 105(c)(2) suggests that the
Secretary of Labor may defer to other federal agencies while they
investigate or prosecute the same complaint. The Secretary did,*
however, develop such a policy of deference to the NLRB under
OSHA. This practice was invalidated in Newport News Ship-
building and Drydock Co. v. OSHA.15' The court's holding is equally
applicable in the Mine Act. Once the Secretary finds a violation,
the court said, the plain language of the statute compels him to
bring an action on the employee's behalf."'
No policy of administrative deference has been announced by
MSHA, but there are in effect certain memoranda of understand-
ing." The agreement with the Employment Standards Adminis-
tration (ESA) provides that ESA will defer to MSHA on com-
plaints within the jurisdiction if both.193 The NLRB has agreed
to grant similar deference to MSHA.19"' Thus, it is unlikely that
MSHA will be criticized for improperly deferring to other federal
agencies. 195
1 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1980). Model rules were issued by the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States on June 25, 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg.
32,900 (1981).
5 U.S.C. S 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
8 OSHC (BNA) 1393, 1980 OSHD (CCH) 24,510 (E.D. Va. 1980).
191 See 29 U.S.C. 5 660(cX2) (1976). In fact, S 105(c)(2) adds the word 'immediate-
ly" to specify when the Secretary must file a complaint with the Commission.
30 U.S.C. S 815(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
MSHA and OSHA have published a memorandum of understanding, 44
Fed. Reg. 22,827 (1979), but it does not deal specifically with discrimination com-
plaints. Rather, it describes the business operations that fall within the jurisdic-
tion of either agency.
19 44 Fed. Reg. 247 (1979).
45 Fed. Reg. 6189 (1980).
The issue of deference to arbitral or state-sponsored tribunals is discuss-
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Another controversial portion of section 105(c) is the provision
in section 105(c)(2) for temporary reinstatement: "[If the Secretary
finds that such complaint was not frivolously brought, the Com-
mission, on an expedited basis upon application of the Secretary,
shall order the immediate reinstatement of the miner pending final
order on the complaint." '
This measure, as well as the authorization of civil penalties
for violations of section 105(c), have long been urged by proponents
of labor law revision, who argue that too many employees are
willing to waive reinstatement rights in exchange for immediate
back pay. 1 Temporary reinstatement offsets this advantage to
employers, promotes speedier resolution of discrimination com-
plaints and encourages employees not to abandon their rights. '98
The drafter of section 105(c) "[felt] that this temporary reinstate-
ment is an essential protection for complaining miners who may
not be in the financial position to suffer even a short period of
unemployment or reduced income pending the resolution of the
discrimination complaint."'99
An order of temporary reinstatement is obtained on an ex
parte application by the Secretary of Labor.0 The application must
be accompanied by a copy of the miner's complaint, a statement
from the Secretary stating his finding that the complaint is not
frivolous and an affidavit setting forth the reasons therefor.20 If
ed in the text accompanying notes 144-155, supra. MSHA apparently did defer
to the NLRB in one recent case, Atlas Minerals, 256 N.L.R.B. 91 (1981).
30 U.S.C. S 815(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
l 7 E.g. "The Aspin Study," exerpted in ATLESON, LABOR RELATIONS & SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 313-17 (1978).
"I As of June 1, 1982, approximately 372 discrimination cases have been
filed with the Commission since 1978. The Secretary of Labor sought and obtained
temporary reinstatement in 33 of these cases, but none since April, 1981. The
number of discrimination cases filed by the Secretary has precipitously declined
in recent months. In fiscal year 1981 (October 1, 1980 through September 30,
1981), 59 cases were filed by the Secretary and 48 by miners on their own behalf.
In the first-eight months of the fiscal year 1982 (October 1, 1981 through May
31, 1982), 18 cases have been filed by the Secretary and 54 cases by miners.
DOCKET OFFICE, FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION.
" S. REP., supra note 6, at 3, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 3437.




Broaderick and Minahan: Employment Discrimination under the Federal Mine Safety and Healt
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the Secretary's finding appears to be supported by the accompa-
nying documents, thd order is issued and is effective upon receipt
or actual notice." As of this writing, an application for temporary
reinstatement filed by the Secretary has never been denied.
The mine operator may request a hearing on the order and
may insist that the hearing take place within five days after the
request is filed."0 3 The conduct of the hearing is entrusted to an
ALJ and the sole issue is whether the miner's complaint was
frivolously brought. After the hearing, the judge may dissolve,
modify or continue the order."0 4
Implementing the temporary reinstatement provisions of the
statute has caused problems for the Secretary and the Commis-
sion. The statute is silent on the question whether a hearing is
required and, if it is, before whom it must be held.
The interim procedural rules"' of the Commission which were
in effect during the first year of its operation, did not provide
for a hearing on a temporary reinstatement order. The order could
be challenged only at a hearing on the merits of the complaint.
The constitutionality of the procedure was challenged by two mine
operators in the same federal district court in actions seeking
The Commission's rule states that the order of temporary reinstatement
is effective upon receipt or actual notice. In practice, however, the Chief ALJ
issues the order and 5 113(d)(1) of the Act states that an ALJ's decision "shall
become the final decision of the commission 40 days after its issuance, unless
within such period the Commission has directed that such decision be reviewed."
30 U.S.C. 5 823(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Can an ALJ's order be "effective" if it is
not final? The Supreme Court has stated that "administrative orders are not
reviewable unless and until they impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some
legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process." Chicago &
S. Air Lines, Inc., v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1948) (em-
phasis added). See also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The
difficult issue of effectiveness cannot be resolved in this article. Perhaps the Com-
mission itself, rather than an ALJ, should issue the order of temporary
reinstatement.
11 See supra note 200.
2" The rule does not expressly provide for an appeal to the Commission,
but S 113(dl((2)(A) of the Act provides for discretionary review of a decision of
an ALJ. Review of temporary reinstatement orders has been granted on at least
two occasions. Secretary of Labor ex rel. Bobby Gooslin v. Kentucky Carbon Corp.,
3 FMSHRC 1707, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1385 (1981); Secretary of Labor ex rel. Karns-
tein v. Allis Chalmers Corp., Docket No. LAKE 80-242-DM (1980).
11 See 43 Fed. Reg. 10,320 (March 10, 1978).
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preliminary injunctions. In the space of three weeks, one judge
denied and another granted the relief sought.21 6
Both decisions expressed reservations about the procedure
followed in temporary reinstatement proceedings and the Com-
mission, after extensive public hearings, issued its new rules of
procedure including Rule 44.2" ' This rule provided for a hearing
on an order of temporary reinstatement limited to the issue
whether the Secretary's finding that the miner's complaint was
not frivolous, was itself arbitrarily or capriciously made."8
The procedure was again challenged in Zeigler Coal Co. v.
Marshall"9 where a federal district court refused to enjoin an
order of temporary reinstatement issued by the Commission. The
court held that the statutory provisions for temporary reinstate-
ment did not contravene due process guarantees. Later, however,
the Commission itself in Secretary of Labor ex rel Gooslin v. Ken-
tucky Carbon Corp. ,21 vacated an order of temporary reinstate-
ment on the ground that the scope of the hearing was so narrow
that it denied the mine operator a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. Thereafter the Commission amended Rule 44, eliminating
the arbitrary or capricious standard, and permitting an operator
to test the sufficiency of a miner's complaint (i.e., whether it was
frivolous) before an ALJ.1
Nevertheless, the procedure afforded still presents constitu-
tional problems. That Congress has the power to provide for tem-
porary reinstatement pending a decision on the merits is no longer
in doubt."2 "Congress has broad latitude to readjust the economic
burdens of the private sector in furtherance of a public purpose.
Only if Congress legislates to achieve its purpose in an arbitrary
or irrational way is due process violated."2 '3 Temporary reinstate-
" S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 450 (S.D. Ohio 1978); compare
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Marshall, No. C-2-78-974 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
See 44 Fed. Reg. 38,226, 38,230-31 (1979).
Id. at 38,231.
502 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Ill. 1980).
210 3 FMSHRC 1707, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1385 (1981).
II See supra note 200.
2" See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S.
454 (1960); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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ment of a miner claiming discriminatory discharge is a rational
way for Congress to attempt to. counteract the effects to job
discrimination.
The Congressional power to readjust the economic burdens
of the private sector is subject to the mandate of the Fifth Amend-
ment that liberty or property not be taken without due process
of law.214 It could be argued that a temporary reinstatement order
deprives a mine owner of liberty and property. In one sense prop-
erty is not taken, however, because the operator receives a day's
work for each day's wages he is ordered to pay."' It is clear that
temporary reinstatement deprives the employer of liberty: the
liberty to manage its business and to hire and fire.216 This interest
is by no means insubstantial. The operator may honestly believe
that the discharged miner is inefficient or insubordinate, and he
may be in fact. Reinstatement may cause disruption or resent-
ment from other employees. If the reinstated employee is a super-
visor, his misconduct or neglect could undermine an entire shift.
It is clear that due process must be observed, and the ques-
tion is, what process is due? The bedrock constitutional re-
quirements are adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.21
Since the Administrative Procedure Act applies to temporary rein-
"'3 Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 958
(7th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S. 359 (1980); see also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
214 Corporations are "persons" protected by the due process clause. Cf. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). It has been assumed that
due process is required before the NLRB can order an employer to bargain with
a union. U.S. Pillow Corp. v. McLeod, 208 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
21' The Secretary of Labor ordinarily agrees to "economic reinstatement,"
in which the miner is paid though he does not actually return to work, when
the operator contends that returning him to the job would jeopardize production
or tranquility in the workplace. S. Ohio Coal Co., 464 F. Supp. at 452.
218 Property interests are derived from laws, regulations or practices creating
an entitlement to a certain interest. Liberty interests are those freedoms to which
a person is thought entitled in d free society. Liberty includes "the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life...
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923). It should be noted, however, that the common law doctrine
of employment at will is being eroded by judge - made exceptions based on public
policy. See Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
217 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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statement proceedings," 8 these requirements are statutorily man-
dated as well. But the requirements are more than a matter of
form. The hearing must be timely provided and may not be undu-
ly restricted in scope.
The new Commission rule broadening the scope of a temporary
reinstatement hearing makes it consistent with practice under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 '1 9 The issue at the hearing is
whether the miner's complaint was frivolously brought. This could
be said to be equivalent to the issue of "probable cause" in federal
civil practice.22
Despite the new Commission rule, the question whether a
hearing is timely afforded an operator remains a problem. Under
the present rule the hearing will in almost all cases follow the
issuance of the order.
Whether a hearing must precede a deprivation of liberty or
property is not entirely clear from recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements. In one case the Court said that when the govern-
ment proposes to take a person's liberty or property, a post-
deprivation hearing is permissible only in "rare and extraordinary
situations."" Other cases, however, show a greater tolerance for
a post-deprivation hearing so long as a specific factual showing
must be made before a neutral magistrate as soon as practicable.
III See ITT v. Local 134, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 419 U.S. 428, 443-44
(1975); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
219 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
' In an early draft of the Mine Act, the House Committee stated that "prob-
able cause for the miner's complaint" would trigger the Secretary's obligation
to investigate the charges. H. REP., supra note 1, at 24, LEG. HIST., supra note 1,
at 380. Both standards have been looked to in proceedings to enjoin alleged viola-
tions of the Labor Act: "In determining whether reasonable cause exists to believe
that unfair labor practices have been committed, the district court need only decide
that the Board's theories of law and fact are not insubstantial or frivolous." Boire
v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1975).
1' Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570, n.7 (1972);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971). Some of the rare and extraordinary situa-
tions include the seizure of contaminated food, N. Am. Cold Storage v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); collection of taxes from a delinquent taxpayer, Phillips
v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); confiscation of enemy property in wartime,
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); and revocation of the
driver's license of one who poses a hazard to highway safety, Dixon v. Love, 431
U.S. 105 (1977).
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mit-
chell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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We believe the above cases establish that there must be a
demonstrable need for immediate action in order to sustain an
ex parte deprivation of liberty or property. This policy is followed
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 and in other federal
statutes in the labor field. The NLRB can obtain an injunction
restraining allegedly unfair labor practices without prior notice
and a hearing only in extraordinary circumstances. 4 And it may
not order an employer to bargain with a labor union without first
providing a hearing to resolve disputed issues of fact.22 In the
Mine Act itself an inspector may summarily close an entire mine
only in situations of "imminent danger."'
Challenges to the procedure followed in temporary reinstate-
ment proceedings are likely to continue. In our opinion, the new
Commission rule is inadequate. If a post-deprivation hearing is
to be the norm, the Secretary should be required to state on his
application not only his finding that the complaint is not frivolous,
but also facts from which it may be inferred that serious harm
to the policies underlying the Mine Act are likely to occur in the
time it would take to hold a hearing and render a decision on
whether an order of temporary reinstatement should issue.22
FED. R. Civ. P. 65; 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.0411] (2d ed.
1976).
-1 29 U.S.C. S 160(j) (1976). Section 10(j) of the Labor Act requires the NLRB
to issue a complaint before requesting an injunction. Id. In contrast, 5 105(c)(2)
of the Mine Act requires only a finding that the miner's complaint is not frivolous
before a temporary reinstatement order is issued. 30 U.S.C. S 815(c)(2) (Supp. IV
1980). In extraordinary circumstances, a § 10(j) injunction may be obtained on
an ex parte basis, but only on a showing of immediate and irreparable harm to
the policies of the Act and only on condition that it last no more than 10 days.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). See generally, Levine v. C. & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432 (6th
Cir. 1979); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975).
1 NLRB v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 289 U.S.
917 (1968).
=' 30 U.S.C. S 817 (Supp. IV 1980). An "imminent danger" is a condition which
could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm before the
mine operator can correct it. 30 U.S.C. S 802(j) (Supp. IV 1980).
The legislative history supports this interpretation of the underlying basis
for temporary reinstatement. Miners "may not be in the financial position to suf-
fer even a short period of unemployment or reduced income pending the resolu-
tion of the discrimination complaint." S. REP., supra note 6, at 36-37, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3436-37. Congress was "also aware that mining
often takes place in remote sections of the country, and in places where work
in the mines offers the only real employment opportunity." Id. at 35, reprinted
in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS. at 3435.
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If, upon investigation, the Secretary of Labor decides that
discrimination did not occur, the miner may file a complaint on
his own behalf with the Commission. The complaint should be filed
within thirty days of the date the miner is notified of the
Secretary's determination. This deadline is not jurisdictional and
may be waived for equitable reasons. 8 The Secretary ordinarily
makes his determination within ninety days of receipt of the com-
plaint, but if that period expires and no determination has been
made, the miner may nevertheless file his complaint with the
Commission. 9
In practice, the Commission will accept a letter from the miner
stating his disagreement with the Secretary's determination in
satisfaction of the filing deadline. The Commission then writes
to the miner requesting copies of his original complaint to MSHA
and the Secretary's determination letter. It also requests proof
that the complaint' was delivered to the respondent, which may
consist of a return receipt for certified.mail. 1 Once the respon-
dent files an Answer, the case is assigned to an ALJ for further
proceedings. The hearing is de novo and no weight is assigned
to the Secretary's determination."
The remedies available to a successful complainant have been
previously described.' If the complainant has sued on his own
behalf, he may, in addition to these remedies, recover costs, ex-
penses, and attorneys' fees if he prevails. Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express's sets forth the twelve criteria commonly used
to compute an award of attorneys' fees. 5 Precedent from other
See supra note 178. It has been held, however, that a delay of eight months
in filing a complaint warranted dismissal of an action under § 105(c)(3). Monahan
v. Exxon Minerals Co., 3 FMSHRC 1844 (1981).
29 C.F.R. § 2700.40(b) (1981). If an order of temporary reinstatement has
been issued, the Secretary must notify the Commission of the decision adverse
to the miner and the order will be dissolved. 29 C.F.R. S 2700.44(b) (1981).
The miner may use his original complaint to MSHA as his complaint to
the Commission or he may draft a new one. It is important that he inform the
respondent that he does not agree with MSHA's determination and is taking his
case to the Commission.
' 29 C.F.R. § 2700.7(b) (1981).
Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
See supra text accompanying notes 156-77.
448 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
These criteria were extensively reviewed in Council of the Southern Moun-
tains v. Martin County Coal Corp., 3 FMSHRC 526, 2 MSHC (BNA) 1058 (1981).
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fields indicate that a law firm handling a case on a pro bono basis
may recover attorneys' fees." Similarly, attorneys' fees may not
be reduced because the firm is a legal clinic funded by govern-
ment contributions."? The time spent processing an appeal is also
reimbursable, as is the time spent litigating the issue of attorneys'
fees."8
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to survey the major facets
of section 105(c) Qf the Mine Act. From the standpoint of the practi-
tioner in the field, the law is still in its infancy; major issues, such
as the right to refuse to work and temporary reinstatement, still
await definitive resolution. We believe that as mining becomes
increasingly important to the national economy, familiarity with
the Mine Act will be essential to many members of the legal
profession.
Anti-discrimination provisions are not unique to the Mine
Act, 9 but the development of the law consciously involving the
employees in the enforcement of safety regulation and protecting
that involvement is unique. Nearly a century of legislative exper-
ience has convinced Congress that, because of the inherent risk
to life and limb, the participation of each miner in the enforce-
ment of safety and health laws is the only way to ensure effec-
tive and consistent safety and health practices through the in-
dustry. The declaration that "the first priority and concern of all
in the coal or other mining industry must be the health and safe-
ty of its most precious resource-the miner""24 is more than pious
rhetoric. The 'nation cannot afford to return to the era when the
product--whether coal or gold-was more valued than the labor-
ers who produced it.
With6rspoon v. Sielaff, 507 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Mary and Crystal v. Ramsden, 635 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980); Reynolds v.
Coomey 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (1st Cir. 1978).
Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106, 111 (5th Cir. 1975).
See Felio, Discharge of Profesional Employees: Protecting Against Dismissal
for Acts Within A Professional Code of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTs L. REV.
149 (1980); Solomon & Garcia, Protecting The Corporate Whistle Blower Under
Federal Anti-Retaliation Statutes, 5 J. CORP. L. 275 (1980).
240 30 U.S.C. 5 801(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Congress reasoned that "if miners are to be encouraged to
be active in matters of safety and health, they must be protected
against any possible discrimination which they might suffer as
a result of their participation."' "l It may be that the industry pays
a price for this policy. It is also true that vindictive or irresponsi-
ble miners might abuse it. But the need for safety and health in
the mines far outweighs these difficulties and, in the long run,
we think it is self-evident that a clean and safe mine is a more
efficient and productive mine.
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